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mums I believe necessary for effective revenue-sharing legislation.

It does include substantial fiscal relief—a beginning figure of \$5.3 billion, split \$1.8 to the States and \$3.5 to the communities. The funds are allocated on the basis of need. The legislation does have strong antidiscrimination provisions. It does have innovative provisions for the Federal collection of State income tax; and the categories for expenditures are broad and explicit.

Mr. President, I hope that the Senate will act expeditiously on this legislation.

The mayors of our cities and communities want it.

The Governors of our States want it.

The people of the Nation want it.

It must be passed.

THE NAVAL BLOCKADE ON NORTH VIETNAM

MR. STEVENSON. Mr. President, Keyes Beech, of the Chicago Daily News, has been covering the fighting in Indochina since the Vietnamese war against the French—probably for longer than any other American journalist. His views of the President's May 8 escalation were printed in today's issue of the News. They should be of interest to the Members of the Senate, and I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A STAGGERING GAMBLE

(By Keyes Beech)

President Nixon's decision to impose a naval blockade on North Vietnam is the act of an angry and desperate man. He has, in effect, matched Hanoi's all-out offensive to conquer South Vietnam with his own last roll of the dice.

It is a staggering gamble.

He is risking a bigger war to win a small war. He is telling the Russians—and the Chinese—they cannot deliver arms to North Vietnam but that the United States can and will deliver arms to South Vietnam.

In doing so he has invited a confrontation with the world's two great Communist powers at a time when he was moving toward an accommodation with them.

Moreover, by a single stroke, he is attempting to achieve a victory that has eluded the United States and its allies for more than a decade.

He could—although the possibility is remote—get away with it. Neither China nor Russia wants to go to war over Vietnam. But it seems inconceivable that the two Communist giants, competing as they are for Hanoi's allegiance, can afford to accept Mr. Nixon's ultimatum.

Regardless of the response from Moscow and Peking, there can be no doubt what Hanoi will do. For the hard and faceless men who run North Vietnam there can be no turning back. They write their own ticket. They accept aid but they do not take orders from Moscow or Peking.

Over the long haul, it is possible the blockade could reduce Hanoi to military impotence—if Mr. Nixon can make it stick. But there is little or no prospect that it will stop Hanoi's current offensive.

It is easy to believe the Communists when they say they have stockpiled enough war material to continue their offensive. And, in any case, it takes weeks or months for war supplies unloaded at Haiphong to reach the fighting front.

There is nothing new about Mr. Nixon's

decision to bomb the two rail lines linking Hanoi with China. That was done during the '60s. An estimated 50,000 Chinese soldier-laborers were sent into North Vietnam to keep the rail lines open. They were withdrawn when the bombing ended in 1968.

But in imposing a naval blockade—although Mr. Nixon was careful not to use that word—the President took a course that Lyndon Johnson shied away from in 1967.

That I know from personal experience. During an interview with Mr. Johnson in May, 1967, I asked him if he intended to bomb Haiphong.

"I'm not going to say whether I will or whether I won't," said Mr. Johnson. "An awful lot of good people come in here and tell me that's what I ought to do."

"But sure as Hell if I did, one of our pilots would drop a bomb down the smokestack of one of those Russian ships out there in the harbor. And next morning, after Russia had declared war, all those good people who wanted me to bomb Haiphong would come in and say:

"Mr. President, that ain't what we meant at all."

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business. If not, morning business is concluded.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1972

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3526) to provide authorizations for certain agencies conducting the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1175 of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

MR. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The motion was agreed to; and at 1:23 p.m. the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 1:35 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HUGHES).

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 3526) to provide authorizations for certain agencies conducting the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes.

MR. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I seek recognition. I will be talking on a matter germane. What is the matter before us?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending matter before the Senate is the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), No. 1175 to the pending bill, S. 3526.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM NO. 1

MR. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I think what I have to say is very germane to that subject, because it deals with our involvement in Southeast Asia, and at the same time it deals with what the President of the United States reported to the American people concerning the course of action he has chosen to undertake in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I attempted some time back to release a study to the U.S. Senate because I felt its information to be very important with respect to the decisionmaking that was taking place in the White House with regard to the American policy that we face today. I hurriedly, after last night's decision, have gone over that study.

It is interesting to note that whenever we have a study like this, one can always find new material in it, and he can find in it something that is even more relevant today than before. I tried to look for material that was related directly to the blockade of Haiphong and the other ports.

I think there was something that was left unsaid in the President's statement yesterday as he began to escalate toward a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union—and we should not talk only about the Soviet Union. I think we should begin to talk about China, which, of course, borders Vietnam.

But in this National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, the question was asked, What would be the effects of blockading all of the naval ports of North Vietnam? The answers are very clear, I have the answers, and I would like to bring them forward now to this body and to the American people since they are so relevant to what the President proposed in his message.

The answer from the State Department is:

To begin with, it must be noted that in practical terms it would be impossible to deny all imports by sea. Even if the one principal port (Haiphong) and the two secondary ports (Cain Pha and Hon Gai) were closed, there would still be twelve minor ports as well as numerous coastal transshipment points suitable for over-the-beach offloading. Lightering operations would permit an indeterminate amount of supplies to enter North Viet-Nam from the sea.

Lightering may be something that some of my colleagues are not familiar with, but it is something that we in Alaska, not being blessed with developed ports on our coastal areas, are familiar with. Basically, the west coast of Alaska is supplied entirely by lightering.

To think that a blockade of North Vietnam would be successful is incorrect, based not only on my domestic experience in Alaska, but based on the experience of the Secretary of State and the entire State Department.

An answer from the CIA on the same subject—and I am quoting it—is as follows:

Strikes in August, 1967 against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping through service for a total of only ten days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no insignificant or sustained reduction of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line capacity, after destruction of the Viet Tri

Nixon Goes on TV in Vietnam Crisis

By STAN CARTER

Washington, May 8 (NEWS Bureau)—President Nixon, after an extraordinary three hour meeting with the National Security Council, scheduled a radio-TV address to the nation tonight to discuss the enemy offensive in Vietnam.

He was expected to announce a tough new course of action to thwart the 40-day-old North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.

The White House would only say that the President had "something important to say" in the address, scheduled for 9 p.m.

Nixon asked for TV and radio time after holding the emergency session with his highest-level advisers to chart Vietnam strategy.

Diplomatic Move, Too?

All the indications were that new military action was in the offing. There was speculation that it would be a blockade of Haiphong harbor, or a South Vietnamese commando raid into the North, and that the action would be coupled with some kind of new diplomatic move.

An attack today by U.S. Navy planes on storage depots, barracks, and training facilities 15 miles west of Hanoi was viewed here as the prelude to more intensive bombing of the North Vietnamese heartland. It was the first air strike in the Hanoi-Haiphong area since April 16, apparently ending a period of self-imposed restraint while Nixon attempted to determine if the

North Vietnamese were ready for serious peace negotiations.

Despite claim by the Hanoi radio, the best information is that American pilots still are under orders to avoid attacks on North Vietnamese irrigation dikes or other such civilian targets, and that no change is contemplated.

The Pentagon said there had been no reports from pilots of having hit dikes. The White House said there had been no change in policy since Nixon told a Texas audience eight days ago that bombing the dikes "is something we want to avoid."

Keeping Them Home

There was a crisis atmosphere in Washington as the security council held its first formal meeting in nearly two months—and the longest in many months—in the White House Cabinet Room.

As usual, the content of the discussion between the President and his advisers on defense and foreign policy was secret.

Participating with the President were Vice President Agnew, Secretary of State Rogers, Defense Secretary Laird, Treasury Secretary Connally, presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Gen. George Lincoln, head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

The emergency nature of the session was underlined by Rogers being summoned home from a European tour and by Kissinger's postponement, for the second time, of a scheduled visit to Japan.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren said he understood that Rogers would return to Europe "shortly to resume his tour." The secretary was in Europe briefing allied leaders on Nixon's visit to Moscow.

Warren said that there had been no change in plans for the Moscow summit meeting, scheduled to begin May 22.



UPI photo

South Vietnamese refugees leave Hue en route south to Da Nang.

STATINTL

Pentagon Experts Say Mining of Ports Will Have a Delayed-Action Impact

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 8—Pentagon analysts say that while the mining of Haiphong and other harbors of North Vietnam, ordered tonight by President Nixon, may have a negligible effect on the war over the short run, its impact will be substantial over the long run.

Over the short term, the analysts concede, even effective denial of outside war supplies probably would not cripple enemy offensive capabilities in the South for several weeks.

To be really effective, they note, mining should probably be accompanied by a persistent bombing campaign to cut traffic over two rail lines and eight roads from China.

The Longer-Term Gain

But over the longer term, the analysts believe, denial of large quantities of gasoline, artillery and antiaircraft ammunition and tanks would make it quite difficult for North Vietnam to continue to attack, or to withstand South Vietnamese counteroffensives.

Well-placed military sources said that the B-52 raid in the Haiphong area three weeks ago so disrupted unloading and storage facilities that North Vietnam has recently diverted freighters inbound to Haiphong from Canton and Hong Kong to the secondary port of Hongay, about 20 miles north.

Defense sources say that at the time of the mining operation, which President Nixon says has already begun, about 37 freighters and oil tankers were in Haiphong harbor and its estuary. Most of the ships were from Soviet bloc nations and from Cuba; about 8 to 10 were from Hong Kong and Britain.

An additional 30 ships appeared to be heading for North Vietnam.

Three Days to Leave
In his televised address tonight, the President said that the mining operation was underway as he spoke but that the mines would not be activated until three "daylight periods" had elapsed, to allow ships now in port to leave.

Thereafter, he said, any ships entering or leaving any of the ports of North Vietnam would do so "at their own risk."

Military sources said that

able for naval aircraft to drop to block the entrances to such ports as Haiphong, Hongay, Camphor and Thanhhoa. These were the following:

Anchored Mines: These are buoyant mines, anchored by cable to the seabed, and placed at different depths below the surface to intercept different types of vessels.

Magnetic Mines: These mines, normally used in shallow water, sink into the mud and explode when a large metallic body, such as a ship, passes overhead.

Acoustic Mines: These are keyed to explode when they pick up the sounds of a large vessel's propellers.

Pressure mines: These are triggered when the passage of a large ship increases the water pressure on them.

Military sources said that such advanced mines were very difficult to eliminate with minesweepers. "It's become a much higher-risk business than ever before," one Pentagon official said tonight. "The mines have all kinds of devices to thwart such efforts."

Question and Amplification

The President did not use the word "blockade" at any point, but one passage in his speech, and a passage in a letter informing the United Nations of American intentions, raised the question of whether some sort of naval blockade was involved.

Mr. Nixon said Saigon and Washington were advising their respective naval and air forces "to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies."

Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, insisted in answer to questions that "a blockade involves the stopping and searching of ships; this was not indicated in the President's words tonight."

Other Pentagon sources said that the President's reference was to the possible use by North Vietnam of inter-coastal lighters—small cargo vessels—to move supplies along its coast. These would be subject to air and sea attack, the sources said.

The Soviet Union and China and other Communist nations, the Pentagon sources said, do not now attempt deliveries in anything but large-ocean-going ships.

tempted to deliver supplies along the coast with such small lighters, at a place that was not mined, would the vessels be subject to air or sea attack?

A Defense official said: "I won't speculate on what might happen in that unlikely situation."

'They've Been Forewarned'

Military analysts said that a full-scale blockade, in which United States naval vessels tried to turn away or stop and search Soviet, Chinese or other ships, under threat of sinking if they failed to heed, would have raised a major confrontation that the United States wished to avoid.

"If they chose to try to run our minefields and are sunk, they've been forewarned," the Administration official said.

"That's fundamentally different than signaling a Soviet vessel to turn back or be shot out of the water by us."

During the Johnson Administration, suggestions by the military that Haiphong be mined were consistently rejected, partly because of fear of forcing the Soviet Union or China into undesirable responses and partly because of the argument that enough supplies could always be slipped into North Vietnam by land and sea for what was then essentially a guerrilla effort in the South to continue.

Picture Now Different

The Nixon Administration has repeatedly made the point that the heavy dependence of North Vietnamese army units in the present fight on tanks, long-range artillery and air defense weapons—which require a large-scale, continuous supply of replacements, gasoline and ammunition—creates a fundamentally different situation.

Well before North Vietnam switched to large-scale, conventional warfare, analysts for the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a review of Vietnam options for President Nixon in early 1969, concluded that a mining-bombing effort would markedly undermine Hanoi's war potential.

The State Department declared: "We therefore believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would, over time, prevent North Vietnam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to con-

Nixon Orders North Vietnam Ports Mined, Railroads Bombed to Stem Arms Supplies

Latest Moves Will Directly Affect Soviet Shipping; Moscow Talks in Jeopardy

By ROBERT KEATLEY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — President Nixon ordered the mining of all North Vietnamese seaports in what he described as an effort to keep "the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws" who govern that Communist country.

The move—never before attempted in the long Indochinese fighting—risks a direct naval confrontation with the Soviet Union, Hanoi's main arms supplier. It also jeopardizes prospects for the planned Moscow summit meeting scheduled to begin May 22.

In a nationally televised speech last night, Mr. Nixon also said he has ordered attacks against all railroad and other transportation systems serving North Vietnam. This move will most directly affect China, which uses overland routes to send civilian and military goods to its Communist ally.

In addition to the new moves designed to keep weapons and ammunition from North Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said air and naval attacks against that country will continue. Heavy bombing of North Vietnam by U.S. planes resumed after the Communists began their current invasion of South Vietnam about five weeks ago.

The President said the new retaliation against North Vietnam would remain in effect until all American war prisoners are returned by Hanoi, and an internationally supervised cease-fire prevails throughout Indochina—meaning both Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia.

He then offered a new U.S. concession: "At that time, we will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months." This cuts two months from the previous withdrawal offer made to North Vietnam.

So far, Hanoi consistently has rejected any such terms, and insists it won't make political concessions because of American military pressure. Instead, Communist propaganda has been urging that all Vietnamese follow a command by the late President Ho Chi Minh: "Fight until the Americans leave and the (Sailor) puppets are toppled."

But President Nixon said, in words directed at Hanoi, that accepting a cease-fire and returning POWs "wouldn't require surrender and humiliation on the part of anybody." Instead, he said, such terms would allow the killing to stop, and "allow negotiations on a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves."

Russia Cautioned

Despite the new moves that will directly affect Soviet shipping, Mr. Nixon indicated he hopes his Moscow meeting still takes place and warned it will be the Soviet Union's fault if it doesn't.

Speaking directly to Moscow's leaders, he noted that the two superpowers are near agreement on such important subjects as arms control and trade, which he called "the threshold of a new relationship which can serve not only the interests of our two countries but the cause of world peace." Then he added: "We are prepared to continue to build this relationship. The responsibility is yours if we fail to do so."

Whether the Soviet Union is willing to let the U.S. block its aid to a Communist ally, however, is uncertain. Moscow maintains it has both the right and duty to send Hanoi arms despite American objections. "It is our international duty to help them, and we shall fulfill that duty to the end," Soviet Communist Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev promised recently in a major speech.

This makes Mr. Nixon's latest efforts to terminate the Indochinese fighting risky; Moscow may choose to run the U.S. blockade and force Washington to choose between backing down, or replying with force.

This prospect of a direct confrontation with the Russians, plus concern about apparent escalation of the war, will almost certainly make Mr. Nixon's latest steps controversial at home. Congressional doves, for example, probably will renew their demands for the possible move the President flatly rejected last night—total American withdrawal from the war.

Some critics likely will contend that the mining efforts, plus heavier bombing of overland supply routes, won't work. Evidence supporting this argument surfaced, recently with the publication of a previously secret White House document, written in early 1969. At that time, Pentagon civilians and Central Intelligence Agency analysts argued "the overland routes from China, alone, could provide (North Vietnam) enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign." They claimed this would be true even if "all imports by sea were denied."

Hanoi Leaders Assailed

Mr. Nixon tried to convince his public that the new moves are both necessary and unavoidable. He was particularly critical of the Hanoi leadership, which he frequently described with such words as "arrogant," "intransigent" and "bombastic."

He said the current Communist invasion of South Vietnam, which for the first time in 20 years of fighting has given Hanoi's forces control of a complete South Vietnamese province, is a "brutal assault" conducted with "wanton disregard for human life." Despite this, Mr. Nixon said, he ordered resumption of both public and private political negotiations with North Vietnam, only to have the Communist repeat demands the U.S. previously had rejected. "They refused to offer any new approach of their own," the President complained.

Therefore, he continued, he decided upon decisive military action "to keep the weapons off the streets." Specifically, he said entrances to all North Vietnamese ports are being mined to prevent ac-

cess to them, and to stop all North Vietnamese naval activity. He also freed American forces to take "appropriate measures" on the high seas and inside North Vietnam's territorial waters to interdict supply lines.

In addition, he said rail and other communications lines "will be cut to the maximum extent possible," while air and naval attacks against North Vietnamese military targets will continue.

He offered one small concession to foreign ships currently at Haiphong or other North Vietnamese ports. He said they would be given three daylight periods during which they could leave "in safety." Afterwards, the mines will become active and any ships trying to arrive or depart "will do so at their own risk," the President warned.

The mining will affect more than the Russians and Chinese, two Communist countries with which Mr. Nixon has tried to improve overall political relations. In addition, some British-flag ships, based in Hong Kong, carry supplies to Haiphong, as do ships from such East European nations as Poland. It's also believed some Greek freighters call there as well.

Mr. Nixon said the Soviet Union and other shipping nations were informed in advance about the new blockade measures. Moscow authorities didn't have any immediate public reaction, but the range of actions available to the Soviets is wide.

For one thing, the USSR has scores of modern minesweepers in its fleet, and could order some to accompany its cargo ships bound for Haiphong. This raises the question of whether the U.S. would let them disrupt the minefield or instead take the promised "appropriate measures" to ensure that supplies don't get through even if it meant attacking the ships and their escorts.

In addition, Moscow could decide to send new supplies by air. This would force the U.S. to decide whether it wants to shoot down Soviet planes, or attack the civilian airport at Hanoi, which has been off limits to date American bombers.

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President's Move Long Urged By Military, Fought by Others

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

By choosing to block Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports, President Nixon has finally opted for a policy urged on the White House by U.S. military men since the early days of American involvement in the Vietnam war.

Mr. Nixon's move, however, runs counter to the counsel given to him and his predecessor, President Johnson, by advisers of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as in the State and Defense Departments.

Indeed, few conflicts inside the U.S. government within recent years have been as intense as the debate over whether to take action against Soviet and other aid shipments destined to reach North Vietnam by sea.

Advocates of the strategy now being pursued by President Nixon consistently held that such an approach, combined with stronger and wider U.S. bombings of North Vietnam, would decisively set back the Communists.

Opponents' View

Opponents of the President's latest step have long argued against it on two counts. First, they have warned that it would jeopardize U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, perhaps to the point of provoking them into war. Secondly, they have expressed doubts that pressure on Hanoi's supply lines would suffice to discourage the Communists.

One of the most vocal supporters of a tough thrust against the Communists was Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, former commander of the American forces in the Pacific. Writing in the Reader's Digest in May 1969, after his retirement, Sharp disclosed that he and his Pentagon colleagues had proposed a plan almost exactly identical to that currently being carried out by President Nixon.

Asserting that closing an enemy harbor is customary

and logical in warfare," Sharp said that he had recommended blocking Haiphong "with mines laid by aircraft." This "was the simplest and most effective measure we could have taken," he wrote, adding that it "would have shortened the war by many months."

But, Sharp contended, his suggestion "was always vetoed" on the grounds that it "would not affect the enemy's capability of waging war in South Vietnam." He placed the blame for "needless casualties" that resulted on former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Sharp wrote:

Advice "Discarded"

"Secretary McNamara arbitrarily and consistently discarded the advice of his military advisers. His insistence that we pursue the campaign on a gradualistic basis gave the enemy plenty of time to cope with our every move. He was, I submit, dead wrong."

The Pentagon Papers have revealed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff echoed Sharp's proposal as early as October 1966, urging that President Johnson authorize such operations as "mining ports" and a "naval quarantine" designed, among other things, to "decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas."

But suggestions along this line were sharply rejected at the time by McNamara. In a draft memorandum delivered to President Johnson on May 19, 1967, the former Defense Secretary reacted strongly against intensified bombings of North Vietnam in general and minning the enemy's harbors in particular with two main arguments.

In the first place, McNamara contended that bombing was essentially ineffective and that "no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the flow of men and materiel to the South."

Asserting that closing an enemy harbor is customary

Pilot Losses

McNamara also said that the losses in American pilots—one for every 40 sorties—was excessive. In addition, he pointed out, more intensive American bombings would reflect unfavorably on the United States abroad and also have an adverse impact at home. He said:

"The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States—especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be 'successful'."

In McNamara's view, there was a serious risk in the effect of mining the Haiphong harbor on the Soviet Union. The former Defense Secretary's observations then may be relevant to the present situation.

Mining North Vietnam's ports, he said, "would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such a disadvantageous place."

Action Discouraged

McNamara discounted the likelihood that the Russians would try to "force a confrontation" with the United States in the region, where "even with minesweepers" they were as inferior militarily as "we were when they blocked the corridor to Berlin in 1961."

He calculated, however, that Moscow might decide, among other moves, to "send volunteers, including pilots" to North Vietnam and simultaneously reply to the United States with "some action" in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or "most likely Berlin"—places "where they can control the degree of crisis better."

McNamara also estimated that if Peking read the min-

ing of Haiphong as an indication that the United States "was going to apply military pressure until North Vietnam capitulated," the Chinese might "intervene in the war with combat troops," thereby prompting American raids against China's airfields "and perhaps other targets as well."

President Johnson rebuffed the advice of Sharp and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, largely because he was reluctant to clash with the Russians and Chinese, and also because he was wary of domestic political opposition to such a course.

Moreover, as Vietnam specialists working in the government at the time now recall, Johnson was not receptive to schemes that would "win the war faster." Nevertheless, the policy debate continued after President Nixon entered office, and it took on a new urgency as it related to his project to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

A collection of secret documents compiled under the auspices of White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger in early 1969 shows, however, that the conflict over mining the Haiphong harbor and stepping up bombings of North Vietnam fundamentally followed the lines it had during the Johnson administration.

Estimating that 80 percent of Communist aid passed through Haiphong, the Pentagon favored blocking the port while mounting "a strong effort to interdict road and rail transport" from China to Hanoi in "a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign" against all transportation.

The Pentagon proposal precluded "attacks on population as a target" but conceded that the operation would incur "high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets."

Such moves, the Pentagon analysts said, "would, in effect, end the war in North and South Vietnam."

continued